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GUINEY V. UNITED STATES
Avoiding The Hybrid: Creating An Orthodox General
Power Of Appointment In Maryland
Guiney v. United States'
Maryland is unique in its case law concerning the general power
of appointment. A line of decisions beginning in 1888 has "fashioned
a rather strange animal."2 Although the Maryland courts refer to it
as a general power, it is, rather, a hybrid power, differing from the
orthodox general power of appointment with respect to the possible
appointees of the property subject to the power. Language authorizing
the donee of a power of appointment to appoint "as he sees fit" or
"to whomsoever he wishes" is deemed in every jurisdiction to create
a general power of appointment; the effect of such language, in every
state but Maryland, is to permit the donee of the power to appoint
to anyone he wishes, including himself, his estate, his creditors, or
the creditors of his estate. These are the characteristics of an orthodox
general power. In Maryland, however, the same language would
permit the donee of the power only to appoint to anyone he wishes
except himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate;
this hybrid is known as the Maryland general power. Although
instruments are drafted creating orthodox general powers of appoint-
ment in Maryland, the issue of whether such a power can be created
1. 425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970).
2. Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 1964).
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in Maryland has never been litigated. There are no reported Maryland
decisions upholding an orthodox general power.
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, Guiney v. United States,' may have an important
effect on Maryland law. The issue presented to the court was whether
the language used in a decedent's will was sufficient to create an
orthodox general power of appointment in his widow so as to qualify
the decedent's estate for the marital deduction pursuant to sections
2056(a) and (b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code.4
The decedent's will established a trust for the benefit of his wife
during her life with a testamentary power of appointment in her favor.
The will contained the following relevant language:
. . . and upon her death to transfer, convey and pay over the
principal to or for the benefit of such person or persons or
corporation, and in such lawful interests or estates, whether
absolute or in trust, as my wife by her Last Will and Testament
appoint.... However, I want to make it clear that I am giving my
wife a general power of appointment over this trust in order that
one-half of my estate may qualify for the marital deduction, and
if any sentence or sentences hereinbefore or hereafter written
contravene the policy of the Federal Government in granting
the marital deduction, such sentence or sentences shall be null
and void, as it is fully my intention to take advantage of the
marital deduction as provided by the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, or amendments made thereafter.5
3. 425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2056(a) and (b)(5), provide:
(a) Allowance of Marital Deduction. - For purposes of the tax imposed by
section 2001 [rate of estate tax], the value of the taxable estate shall, except as
limited by subsections (b), (c), and (d), be determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in property
which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to
the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate.
(b) (5) Life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse. - In the
case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse
is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the income
from a specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent intervals,
with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific
portion (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such
surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case the power is
exercisable in favor of others), and with no power in any other person to appoint
any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than the
surviving spouse-
(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall, for purposes of
subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and
(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph
(1) (A), be considered as passing to any person other than the sur-
viving spouse.
This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving spouse to appoint
the entire interest, or such specific portion thereof, whether exercisable by will or
during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and in all events.
5. Guiney v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D. Md. 1969).
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Upon audit, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the
marital deduction because, under Maryland law,6 the language used
to create the power did not allow the widow to appoint the corpus
to herself or to her estate as required by section 2056(b)(5) of the
Internal Revenue Code. As a result, the decedent's estate's federal
estate tax liability was increased by $12,467.02.' The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland sustained the Com-
missioner's decision that the language created only the Maryland hybrid
power, that under the Maryland power the widow could not appoint
to herself, her estate, her creditors or the creditors of her estate; and
that, therefore, she did not possess the orthodox general power con-
templated by section 2056(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code." The
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a general power of appointment
in the orthodox sense was created and that the requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code were met, so as to qualify the decedent's estate
for the marital deduction. 9
This note will review and discuss the unique Maryland require-
ments for the creation of an orthodox general power of appointment.
The analysis of the Guiney decision will be addressed not only to its
impact on existing Maryland law, but also to the problems faced by
lawyers attempting to draft trusts and wills in accordance with the
decision.
A brief background discussion is in order. Although the use of
powers of appointment preceded the enactment of the Statute of Uses
in 1536,10 it was not until the twentieth century that such powers
attained significance in the United States." Not until then did the
legal scholars begin to analyze and write about powers, or did lawyers
frequently use them.'" The defintion of power of appointment now most
often cited is that contained in the Restatement of Property:
6. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5) ; Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(e)(1970). The Treasury Regulation contains the following provision as to the applica-
tion of local law:
Application of local law. In determining whether or not the conditions set
forth in paragraph (a) (1) through (5) of this section are satisfied by the instru-
ment of transfer, regard is to be had to the applicable provisions of the law of thejurisdiction under which the interest passes and, if the transfer is in trust, the
applicable provisions of the law governing the administration of the trust. For
example, silence of a trust instrument as to the frequency of payment will not be
regarded as a failure to satisfy the condition set forth in paragraph (a) (2) of
this section that income must be payable to the surviving spouse annually or more
frequently unless the applicable law permits payment to be made less frequently
than annually. The principles outlined in this paragraph and paragraphs (f) and(g) of this section which are applied in determining whether transfers in trust
meet such conditions are equally applicable in ascertaining whether, in the case
of interests not in trust, the surviving spouse has the equivalent in rights over
income and over the property.
7. Guiney v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D. Md. 1969).
8. Id.
9. Guiney v. United States, 425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970).
10. 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ff 385 (1970).
11. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWEL.,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 385 (1970) ; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory
Note, Ch. 25 (1940).
12. 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY f" 385 (1970).
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A power of appointment is a power created or reserved by a
person (the donor) having property subject to his disposition
enabling the donee of the power to designate, within such limits
as the donor may prescribe, the transferees of the property or
shares in which it shall be received. s
There are three basic categories of powers: ( 1 ) powers exercisable
by an inter vivos deed only, which are subdivided into powers presently
exercisable and powers of which the exercise is postponed; (2) powers
exercisable by will only; and (3) powers exercisable by deed or will.14
A power of appointment need not be exercisable only over real property,
but may also encompass personalty. 5 The granting of a power does
not in itself confer any estate upon the donee; while it is often made
in conjunction with the granting of some other interest in the property
such as a life estate or an interest as trustee, it may be given to one
without any related property interest.' 6 "A power is not in itself a right
of property, but rather a deputation of the donee to act as agent for the
donor in relation to the latter's property, so that upon its exercise the
property is regarded as passing to the appointee from the donor of the
power under the instrument by which it is created rather than from
the donee .... "17
13. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 318 (1940). The Restatement definition is
restricted by the following language:(2) the term power of appointment does not include a power of sale, a power
of attorney, a power of revocation, a power to cause a gift of income to
be augmented out of principal, a power to designate charities, a charitable
trust, a discretionary trust, or an honorary trust.
Id. One authority proposes that the Restatement mistakenly restricts the definition to
a narrow property-law concept and does not reflect developments in taxation of
powers. Moser, Some Aspects of Powers of Appointment -in Maryland, 12 MD. L.
REV. 13, 15 (1951). Moser suggested a definition that would take these developments
into consideration:
A power of appointment, then, is any right, given by someone (the donor) to
another (the donee) or reserved by the donor to himself, to dispose of property(which the donor owns or has control over) in such manner and to such persons
as the donor may prescribe, except for powers which are ministerial or managerial
in nature, powers of attorney, charitable or honorary trusts, and powers of sale.
Id. A New Jersey court stated that at common law the power of appointment was
defined as[a] liberty or authority reserved by, or limited to, a person to dispose of real or
personal property for his own benefit or for the benefit of others, and operating
on an estate or interest, vested either in himself or in some other person, the
liberty or authority, however, not being derived out of such estate or interest but
overreaching or superseding it, either wholly or partially.
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives, Etc. v. Kelly, 134 N.J. Eq. 120 34 A.2d 538, 545(1943). Cf. Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 24 3, 161 A. 404, 406(1932) ; Maryland Mut. Benevolent Soc'y v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 433, 22 Am. Rep.
52, 55 (1876). Simes and Smith conclude that "a power of appointment is the capacity
to change the ownership of interests in property by an act called an appointment
which operates independent of the ownership of the person in whom the power is
vested." L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 871 (2d ed. 1956).
14. L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 874 (2d ed. 1956).
See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 321 (1940).
15. 5 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 45.1 (Revised
Treatise 1962).
16. Id.
17. Id. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.3 (1952).
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With respect -to the scope of the donee's authority, powers of
appointment are classified as general or special. A power is deemed to
be special if "(a) it can be exercised only in favor of persons, not in-
cluding the donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large, and
(b) the donor does not manifest an intent to create or reserve the
power primarily for the benefit of the donee..'. This discussion will
focus upon the general power of appointment, which allows the donee
to appoint to anyone he chooses and necessarily includes "a power
which is exercisable in favor of the [donee], his estate, his creditors,
or the creditors of his estate. .... 19
In most jurisdictions possession of the general power approxi-
mates ownership. The donee is the "beneficial owner of the property
subject to the power" ;2O although technically the donee does not have
the legal title to the property until he appoints to himself, all this
requires is the formal exercise of the power. If the donee is given a
life interest in the property with a testamentary power of appointment,
the approximation of ownership is present, but to a lesser degree since
the donee can only appoint by will.2s  The construction of the language
creating a power is based on the "same principles as other instruments
creating interests in land and chattels."2 A power, therefore, can be
created expressly or by implication 2 3 by construing the language con-
sistently with the donor's intent. 24 In order to create an orthodox gen-
eral power of appointment, that intent must, of course, be that there
be no restriction as to the persons in favor of whom the power can be
exercised.
Yet the same language which would create an orthodox general
power, present or testamentary, in most jurisdictions, would not suffice
to create the same power in Maryland. For example, the words "to
appoint by will as the donee sees fit" ordinarily create an orthodox tes-
tamentary general power; but Maryland law, well established by a
long line of Maryland cases, 5 would not permit the donee to appoint
18. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 320 (1940).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1).
A power is said to be general if the donee can appoint to himself. RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 320 (1940). Carried forward, possession of a general power
means that the donee can exercise the power "in favor of anyone he chooses." W.BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 45.2 (Revised Treatise 1962).This means that he can appoint to "anyone including himself, his estate, or his
creditors." Moser, Some Aspects of Powers of Appointment in Maryland, 12 MD. L.
REV. 13, 17 (1951). In a testamentary power, since the power is only exercisable by
will, the donee can exercise in favor of his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of
his estate.
20. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.4 (1952).
21. Id.
22. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 892 (2d ed. 1956).
23. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 323, comment f (1940) ; L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 892 (2d ed. 1956).
24. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 323 (1940).
25. See Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Leser v. Burnet,46 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931); Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 253 A.2d 377 (1969);Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 64 A.2d 704 (1949) ; Connor v.O'Hara, 188 Md. 527, 53 A.2d 33 (1947); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Bergdorf & Good-
man Co., 167 Md. 158, 173 A. 31 (1934); Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md.
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to his estate or to the creditors of his estate.26 Such a restricted power
is nevertheless referred to as a general power of appointment by the
Maryland courts.2 7 This "strange animal" 28 has also been labelled the
Maryland general power,29 a naked power, 0 the Maryland hybrid"'
and the minority rule.12 In the interest of clarity, this paper will here-
inafter refer to it as the Maryland hybrid power of appointment.
The Maryland hybrid power of appointment originated in Balls
v. Dampman,33 decided in 1888. Certain land was devised to the donee
for life coupled with a power "to will and dispose of the same in such
manner as she may see fit by any instrument in the nature of a last
will and testament she may see proper to make.'3 4 The donee's will
contained the following provisions:
First. I order and direct all my just debts and funeral ex-
penses to be paid.
Item. I hereby devise and bequeath to my two youngest
daughters . . . all my property .... s
A creditor of the donee brought the action after her death in order that
the property subject to her testamentary power be sold to satisfy a
promissory note due him from the donee. The court concluded that
the will was a valid exercise of the power of appointment in favor of
the daughters. Although the creditor claimed that the first clause pur-
ported to appoint the property in his favor so as to satisfy the debt, the
court held that the use of such language in the will did not amount to
an exercise of a power of appointment. The court reasoned that, since
the law automatically gives priority to the payment of debts and funeral
expenses from the decedent's estate, the language was not an attempt
239, 161 A. 404 (1932) ; Prince de Beam v. Winans, 111 Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909) ;Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906) ; Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390,
16 A. 16 (1888).
26. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 875 (2d ed. 1956):
"It should be pointed out that a line of Maryland cases is to the effect that a testa-
mentary power 'to appoint by will as the donee sees fit' does not include a power to
appoint to the donee's creditors or to his estate as such." See Balls v. Dampman,69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888).27. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 875 (2d ed. 1956);Moser, Some Aspects of Powers of Appointment in Maryland, 12 MD. L. REv. 13,
24 (1951).
28. Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 1964).29. Moser, Some Aspects of Powers of Appointment in Maryland, 12 MD. L.REv. 13, 24 (1951).
30. Leser v. Burnet, 46 F.2d 756, 761 (1931).31. L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 875 (2d ed. 1956).32. Annot., 97 A.L.R. 1071 (1935).
33. 69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888).
34. Id. at 391, 16 A. at 17.35. Id. at 392, 16 A. at 17. The court concluded that the residuary clause was
a valid exercise of the power of appointment in favor of the daughters. It should be
noted, however, that MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 4-407 (1957) now limits the situationsin which a residuary clause will exercise a power of appointment to only the following:i . . if, and only if, (i) an intent to exercise the power is expressly indicatedin the will or (ii) the instrument creating such power of appointment fails toprovide for disposition of the subject matter of the power upon its nonexercise.
[VOL. XXXI
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by the donee to appoint the property to her estate for the satisfaction
of her debts, but was mere surplusage. 6 In an important dictum the
court stated that in any event the donee had no authority to exercise
the power in favor of her estate for the payment of her debts. The court
implied that such a construction would convert the donee "from a mere
life tenant into an owner of the fee."' 7 She could not "consume it for
her own use" since the donor, according to the court, only gave her
the testamentary power to name other persons who should receive the
property.38 The court simply presumed that the donor intended that
the donee name only third person appointees and that any exercise of
the power in favor of the donee's estate or the creditors of her estate
would defeat the donor's intent. The fact that creditors of the donee
were attempting to get at the property subject to the power was most
probably a factor in this decision.
Thus the Maryland hybrid power of appointment originated not
from a holding of law, but from mere dictum. More importantly,
the Balls court cited no authority for the proposition that the donee
could not exercise the power in favor of her estate or for the payment
of her debts. Subsequent decisions kept this rule of interpretation alive,
although the issues of these cases did not require such an affirmation
of the Balls dictum; most of these early cases did not in fact involve
questions of the creation of an orthodox general power and the exercise
of such a power by the donee in favor of himself, his estate, his creditors
or the creditors of his estate.
Repetition of the Balls rule as mere dictum resulted in an intrench-
ment without careful analysis or proper application to the facts of the
particular case. In one instance, the court was concerned with a special
power of appointment and the Balls dictum was clearly not applicable. 9
36. 69 Md. at 394, 16 A. at 18.
37. Id. at 395, 16 A. at 18. In its discussion of Balls v. Dampman, the Fourth
Circuit observed that, considering "the last sentence quoted above from Balls, the
Maryland Court of Appeals was primarily concerned that the creation of a life tenancy
with an unrestricted power of appointment would merge the estates into a fee simple
absolute, thus defeating the testator's intention." Guiney v. United States, 425 F.2d
145, 148 (4th Cir. 1970). It is interesting to note that an 1895 Virginia case held that
"the devise of an estate for life coupled with power of alienation, either express or
implied comprehends everything and the devisee takes the fee." Farish v. Wayman,
91 Va. 430, 21 S.E. 810 (1895). This doctrine has been reaffirmed in subsequent
Virginia cases. See Virginia Nat'l Bank v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 1146 (D.
Va. 1969) ; Mowery v. Coffman, 185 Va. 491, 39 S.E.2d 285 (1946); Hansbrough v.
Trustees of the Presbyterian Church, 110 Va. 15, 65 S.E. 467 (1909).
38. 69 Md. 390, 394, 16 A. 16, 18 (1888).
39. Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906). The donee could only
exercise the power by will in favor of a limited group, his children. Because of this
limitation, the donee had only a special power of appointment. Despite this limitation,
the donee entered into an agreement with his creditors which enabled him to borrow
money in consideration for which he agreed to devise to the creditors a portion of
the property subject to the power. The court held that a "diversion to creditors ...
would be in contravention of the testator's intent as expressed in her will" and
cited Balls in support of the statement. Id. at 110, 63 A. at 210. Since the court
in Price was dealing with a special power of appointment defining a limited class
of appointees, as opposed to the power created by the broader language of Balls,
there was no need for it to resort to the Balls rationale in concluding that the donee
could not appoint to one outside the limited class of appointees in favor of whom
the special power could be exercised.
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In another situation the court dealt with the issue of whether the
grantor-donee exercised his power of appointment by will or whether
he attempted to make a mere testamentary disposition of the property
as his own.4 ° In yet another case repeating the Balls dictum, the ques-
tion was whether, for the purposes of the Maryland inheritance tax,
property passing by testamentary exercise of a power was to be regarded
as passing from the donee of the power and being subject to the
tax, or from the donor. 1
40. Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 161 A. 404 (1932). Thegrantor conveyed his interest in a vested remainder to a trustee, retaining an equitablelife interest as well as a testamentary power of appointment over the trust estate.
See note 68 infra for the terms of the power. He exercised the power by will in favor
of the trust company, as trustee, to assure his wife an annual income until her death
or marriage and thereafter to pay the income to his living children; the trust was
to terminate upon the youngest child reaching twenty-one years of age. The grantor's
executor contended that the corpus of the trust created by the deeds from the grantor-
donee to the trustee reverted to the donee and passed under his will. The issue was
whether the grantor-donee exercised his power by will or whether he attempted to
make a mere testamentary disposition of the property as his own; an exercise of the
power would result in the property passing from the donor of the trust property by
the instrument creating the power, whereas a testamentary disposition would cause
the property to pass through the decedent's estate (so as to be subject to debts, dower
rights, etc.). 163 Md. at 246, 161 A. at 407. The court held that the property passed
from the donor of the power by the deeds of trust and was, therefore, not part of his
estate even though the power was held by him as donee and was exercised by himby will. The court pointed out that a "power retained is, however, not an estate in
the subject-matter of the power." Id. at 245, 161 A. at 406. The court cited Ballsfor the proposition that the property, by an exercise of the power, could not be made
subject to the claims of creditors. Id. at 246, 161 A. at 407. See Mercantile TrustCo. v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 167 Md. 158, 166, 173 A. 31, 34 (1934). Yet the
Balls dictum was not strengthened by this decision since the donee made no effort to
appoint the property to his estate or the creditors of his estate; he, instead, appointed
to a third party.
41. Connor v. O'Hara, 188 Md. 527, 53 A.2d 33 (1947). The court considered
the question of whether, for purposes of the Maryland inheritance tax, property pass-ing by testamentary exercise of a power was to be regarded as passing from the donee
of the power and therefore as being subject to the tax, or from the donor. The donor
left by will the residue of her estate to the donee for life, with the remainder to such
persons as the donee might appoint by will. The donee left his entire estate, including
the property subject to his power of appointment, to his three children. The court
held that "property passes by exercise of a testamentary power of appointment, notfrom the donee of the power but from the donor." Id. at 530, 53 A.2d at 34. See
Prince de Bearn v. Winans, 111 Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909) (pointing out that, for
purposes of the administration of a donee's estate, the appointee does not take title
under the donee's will but from the donor's instrument creating the power). The
court's reference to Balls v. Dampman was in support of its proposition that Mary-land, by the Balls rule "that the donee has no power (unless expressly conferred) to
appoint for payment of his own debts," had rejected the English rule that equity
would regard the property subject to a general power of appointment as an equitable
asset of the donee for the payment of creditors in preference to the claims of voluntary
appointees. 188 Md. at 530, 53 A.2d at 34. The court also cited Price v. Cherbonnier
and Wyeth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. in support of this statement. Yet the reaffirm-
ation of Balls was mere dictum since the donee in Connor appointed to his children
and not to his estate or the creditors of his estate.
See also Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 64 A.2d 704(1949), where the court again unnecessarily reaffirmed the Balls rule. The donor
created a trust to pay income to the donee (his wife) during her life and provided:
"from and after the death of my said wife, I authorize or direct said Trustee to
transfer and deliver the rest and residue of my estate to such person or persons as
she may limit, nominate, and appoint by her last will and testament." Id. at 475,64 A.2d at 705. In her will the donee exercised her power with respect to the property
by creating a life estate with a new power of appointment in another donee. Afterdeciding that the creation of such a subsequent power was valid and within the inten-
tion of the original grantor, the court observed that the property passed by testa-
[VOL. XXXI
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Only in a limited situation has the Maryland Court of Appeals
recognized the creation of an orthodox general power of appointment
where the language used would normally result in the Maryland hybrid.
In Wyeth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.4 2 the donor executed a deed
of trust to the trust company of all her property, reserving to herself an
income interest for life and a testamentary power of appointment to
the effect that: "The said trustee shall hold the residue of my said
property conveyed in trust for such uses as I may by last will and tes-
tament appoint . . . .8 In her will the decedent-donee, among other
provisions, set up a number of separate trusts and called for the pay-
ment of a debt to her brother. Although the will stated that the decedent
was exercising her power, it was not clear in favor of whom the spe-
cific trust property was appointed. The balance of the donee's estate
would not have been sufficient to pay the debt if all other provisions
of the will were first complied with. The court, despite the Balls prece-
dent, construed the will as an exercise of the appointment in favor of
the donee's estate and allowed payment of the debt first, with the resi-
due of the estate going into the trusts created by the will.
The decision noted the rule as to the Maryland hybrid power and
determined that it was inapplicable to the factual situation presented.
In cases where the rule previously had been applied, the donor and
donee were different persons; whereas in Wyeth the donor and the
donee were the same person. Consequently, the donee could not frus-
trate the donor's intent by an exercise of the power in favor of her
estate or the creditors of her estate. 4
Contrary to the approach taken by the Maryland Court of Appeals
in prior cases, the Fourth Circuit has limited its discussion of the Balls
dictum to those cases demanding a ruling on whether the donee had an
orthodox general power. In Leser v. Burnet45 the Fourth Circuit had
to determine if certain property passing under a donee's exercise of a
testamentary power of appointment should have been included in the
gross estate of the donee for the purpose of computing the federal
estate tax. The donor conveyed in a deed of trust certain newspaper
property with a provision that a portion of the property and of the
income therefrom would, "upon the decease of the said Anne E.
Agnus . . . [remain] in trust for the use and behoof of such person or
persons as she, by her last will and testament . . . shall have named,
limited and appointed to take .... ,,46 The donee exercised the power
in favor of her two daughters. The Board of Tax Appeals held that
the value of the property should have been included in the gross estate
mentary power of appointment not from the donee, but from the donor. The court
gratuitously restated the Balls rule that the donee, unless specifically authorized,
could not exercise the power in favor of his estate or the creditors of his estate.
Id. at 482, 64 A.2d at 709.
42. 176 Md. 369, 4 A.2d 753 (1939).
43. Id. at 370, 4 A.2d at 753.
44. Id. at 376, 4 A.2d at 756.
45. 46 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931).
46. Id. at 757-58.
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of the donee since section 402(e) of the Revenue Act of 1921" pro-
vided that property passing under a general power of appointment
exercised by the decedent by will be included in the gross estate of the
decedent. The court, therefore, was required to determine whether,
under Maryland law, the donee had an orthodox general power of
appointment.
In discussing the Maryland hybrid power the court observed that
"under the law of Maryland, language such as that used in [the
donor's] conveyance, which would ordinarily create a general power
with right in the donee to appoint for the benefit of his own creditors,
does not have such effect in Maryland, but creates a naked power from
which neither the estate of the donee nor his creditors can possibly
benefit."' 48 The court concluded, therefore, that the power in question
was not general but limited and that the property subject to the power
was not includible in the donee's gross estate.
Aside from the court's crystallization of the Balls dictum into a
rule of law, Leser is significant in that for the first time a court indi-
cated that the possibility existed that an orthodox general power could
be created in Maryland and set out the manner in which it could be
done:
This does not mean that a general power cannot be created in
Maryland. . . . A general power could doubtless be created in
Maryland by expressing in the language creating it what is held
to be implied in most other jurisdictions, viz., that the donee may
exercise same for his own benefit or for the benefit of his credi-
tors; but unless this is expressed, the power under the Maryland
decisions is not general, but limited. .... 49
That the Fourth Circuit would follow its dictum in Leser be-
came apparent in Pierpont v. Commissioner.50 Like Guiney, Pierpont
dealt with the issue of whether a general power of appointment was cre-
ated under Maryland law so as to qualify the decedent donor's estate for
a marital deduction in the computation of federal estate taxes. The
donor, in discussing the preparation of his will with a trust company,
expressed the desire to adequately provide for his wife while mini-
mizing his estate taxes by qualifying for the marital deduction. The
donor's attorney attempted to accomplish this by creating a testamen-
tary trust, giving the wife a life estate in the income with a power
to appoint the corpus at her death. The provision creating the power
of appointment stated: "the entire remaining principal . . . shall be
paid over free of this Trust in such manner and proportions as my
said wife may designate and appoint in her Last Will and Testament." 1
47. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402(e), 42 Stat. 279. The statute does not
provide for the inclusion of property passing under any power of appointment other
than an orthodox general power of appointment.
48. 46 F.2d at 761.
49. Id.
50. 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
51. Id. at 279.
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In considering the Maryland law on general powers of appoint-
ment, the court conceded that "the crucial question of whether an un-
limited testamentary power of appointment gives the holder power to
appoint to his estate has never been directly passed on by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in a factual setting similar to this case. '"52 The ex-
ecutors argued that the donor clearly intended to take advantage of
the marital deduction and consequently intended to create the general
power of appointment necessary to qualify for that deduction. The
court rejected this argument by stating: "That he had an intention to
take advantage of the marital deduction is doubtlessly clear; that he
entertained the intention to give his widow the power to appoint to
her estate is, at best disputable. But even if Pierpont intended that
Lallah might appoint to her estate, he failed to employ the necessary
language which would have enabled her to do so under Maryland
law."5 8
Although it denied the marital deduct-ion, the court again indi-
cated that it might be possible to create a true general power of appoint-
ment in Maryland if the proper language were employed. Since the
only pronouncements to this effect had been by the Fourth Circuit,
and since the Maryland Court of Appeals had not taken a position on
the subject, technically the issue remained open.
The recent Maryland case of Frank v. Frank,54 while reaffirming
the Balls rule, indicates approval of the dicta in the federal cases recog-
nizing the possibility of creating an orthodox general power in Mary-
land. In Frank the donee of the power sought a declaration as to the
nature and scope of the power granted her by her husband-donor. As
in Pierpont, there was evidence that the donor intended to take advan-
tage of the marital deduction allowed by the Internal Revenue Code.55
In order to so qualify, the power of appointment must have been such
as to have allowed the donee to exercise it in favor of her estate or
the creditors of her estate. 6 The donor's will provided: "I hereby
confer upon my said wife full and complete testamentary power of
disposition over fifty per cent (50%) of the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate [which had been left in trust for the wife for life], free
and clear of all trusts. ' ' 57
The donee argued that the issue of a donee's power to appoint
to herself or her estate had never before been presented to a Maryland
court in the context of the federal marital deduction; since the donor
intended to take advantage of the tax savings, the power created should
be construed as an orthodox general power so as to qualify the donor's
estate for the deduction.58 Appellant further argued correctly that the
prior cases never directly decided the issue, but only referred to it
in dicta; therefore, these cases were not binding authority on the sub-
52. Id. at 282.
53. Id. at 283.
54. 253 Md. 413, 253 A.2d 377 (1969).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a) and (b) (5).
56. Id. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
57. Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 415, 253 A.2d 377, 378-79 (1969).
58. Brief for Appellant at 7, Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 253 A.2d 377 (1969).
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ject.59 The court disregarded these arguments, holding that the donee
could not appoint to herself or her estate. The power was not an ortho-
dox general power because the will did not contain specific words
authorizing such an appointment. 0 For the first time, however, the
Maryland Court of Appeals implied approval of the Leser v. Burnet
pronouncement that an orthodox general power could be created in
Maryland if express enabling language was used ;61 but the mere fact
that the decedent intended to and believed that his estate should qualify
for the marital deduction was not controlling.62
The dicta in the three cases last discussed suggests that a general
testamentary power of appointment can be created in Maryland. To
accomplish this, however, it is necessary to use express language to
the effect that the donee can exercise the power in favor of himself, his
creditors, his estate or the creditors of his estate. An unlimited power
to appoint in the absence of the express language creates only the Mary-
land hybrid power, except for the unusual situation where the donor
and the donee are the same person. Taking this summation as the
Maryland position with respect to the general powers, the inquiry must
then turn to the effect of Guiney v. United States upon the Maryland
law.
Of initial importance is the manner in which the Fourth Circuit
held that the language of the decedent's will" satisfied the "specific
enabling language" requirement necessary to create an orthodox gen-
eral power of appointment. If the Internal Revenue Code definition
of general power of appointment6 4 was incorporated by reference into
the donor's will, the case does not depart from the established rule
because that definition is sufficiently precise to create an orthodox tes-
tamentary general power in the donee. If, on the other hand, this
definition was not incorporated, the language creating the power
would not appear to satisfy the specific language required by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals.6 5 If the latter is the correct interpretation, it
would mean that the Fourth Circuit has significantly liberalized its
interpretation of Maryland law, for it would indicate that the testator's
mere use of the words "general power of appointment" 66 with a spe-
cific reference to "the marital deduction as provided by the Internal
59. See notes 33-41 supra and accompanying text.
60. Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 420, 253 A.2d 377, 382 (1969).
61. Id. at 418, 253 A.2d at 380. The Maryland Court of Appeals observed that
"Leser v. Burnet has been considered as representing a valid expression of Maryland
law by commentators." 1d. The court then listed several sources: Gold, The Classi-
fication of Some Powers of Appointment, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 337 (1942) ; Gump, The
Meaning of "General" Powers of Appointment Under the Federal Estate Tax, 1 MD.
L. Rev. 300 (1937) ; Moser, Some Aspects of Powers of Appointment in Maryland,
12 MD. L. REv. 13 (1951) ; Note, Rights of Creditors Under a Testamentary General
Power of Appointment, 4 MD. L. REv. 297 (1940).
62. 253 Md. 413, 420, 253 A.2d 377, 382.
63. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
64. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1): "the term 'general power of appoint-
ment' means a power which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his
creditors, or the creditors of his estate. .. "
65. See notes 63-71 supra and accompanying text.
66. 425 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1970).
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Revenue Code of 1954 ' '17 would now satisfy the requirement of express
language. Although the court did point out that in no previous Mary-
land case did a testator use these two references in combination,"' it
is unlikely that the court would have rested upon this distinction in
order to reach its holding without incorporating by reference the Code
definition. Frank v. Frank69 stressed the requirement for specific lan-
guage, citing Leser v. Burnet70 and an article by M. Peter Moser which
stated: "However, if a power is made expressly exercisable in favor of
the donee, his estate or his creditors, it is probable that the power will be
treated by Maryland courts as are true general powers in other states."'
Anything less than these express words presumably would not have
been acceptable to the Maryland Court of Appeals at the time of Frank.
It would seem, therefore, that without incorporating the Code definition
of general power of appointment, the language used by the testator in
Guiney fails to satisfy the specific language test required by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals.
The next step is to consider whether the Internal Revenue Code
definition of general power of appointment was, in fact, incorporated
by reference into the donor's will. The doctrine of incorporation by
reference is part of the testamentary law of Maryland ;72 under it, the in-
corporated document becomes part of the will, as if it had been written
67. Id.
68. The early cases, of course, make no mention of the marital deduction since
it was not available before 1948; nor do they use the words "general power." The
language creating the power in Balls v. Dampman was merely:
... to will and dispose of the same in such manner as she may see fit by any in-
strument in the nature of a last will and testament she may see proper to make.
69 Md. 390, 391, 16 A. 16, 17 (1888).
In Pope v. Sale Deposit & Trust Co. the testator used the following
language:
... and, from and after the death of the said Henry May Gittings, to hold said
trust property . . . to the use of such person or persons, as the said Henry May
Gittings shall by his last will and testament, duly executed in accordance with
the laws of the State of Maryland, have appointed to take the same ...
163 Md. 239, 243, 161 A. 404, 405 (1932).
The testator in Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. used the words:
... from and after the death of my said wife, I authorize or direct said Trustee
to transfer and deliver the rest and residue to [sic] my estate to such person or
persons as she may limit, nominate, and appoint by her last will and testament.
192 Md. 472, 475, 64 A.2d 704, 705 (1949).
The donee in Leser v. Burnet said:
... in trust for the use and behoof of such person or persons as she, by her last
will and testament ...appropriately executed, shall have named, limited and
appointed to take and have the same ...
46 F.2d 756, 757-58 (4th Cir. 1931).
In the next two cases the testator intended to take advantage of the marital
deduction but did not use the words "general power" nor expressly refer to the marital
deduction. In Pierpont v. Commissioner the language was "shall be paid over free of
this Trust in such manner and proportions as my said wife may designate and appoint
in her Last Will and Testament." 336 F.2d 277, 279 (4th Cir. 1964). The donor in
Frank v. Frank said: "I hereby confer upon my said wife full and complete testa-
mentary power of disposition .. " 253 Md. 413, 415, 253 A.2d 377, 378 (1969).
69. 253 Md. 413, 253 A.2d 377 (1969).
70. 46 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931).
71. Moser, Some Aspects of Powers of Appointment in Maryland, 12 MD. L.
REv. 13, 21 (1951).
72. See, e.g., Hull's Estate, 164 Md. 39, 163 A. 819 (1933). The prior case law




therein.73 In order for the doctrine to operate, however, there are cer-
tain requirements which must be met. It is essential that the will itself
distinctly refer to a written instrument 74 with sufficient certainty that
it may be identified and distinguished from other similar writings.75
The paper referred to must also be in existence at the time the will is
executed, 76 and the will must refer to the document as one already in
existence. 7' The reference, furthermore, must show an intention to
incorporate the document.7 8
Did the testator's will in Guiney incorporate by reference the defi-
nition of general power of appointment contained in section 2041 (b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code? The provision of the will did not
expressly refer to section 2041 (b) (1) nor did it indicate a general
power of appointment as defined in section 2041(b) (1). The exact
words were "a general power of appointment over this trust in order
that one-half of my estate may qualify for the marital deduction ...
as it is fully my intention to take advantage of the marital deduction
as provided by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or amendments
made thereafter. ' 79 The court stated that "[b]y his use of the words
'general power of appointment,' coupled with his expressed 'inten-
tion to take advantage of the marital deduction as provided by the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954,' the testator was clearly referring to
the general power of appointment provisions of section 2041 of the
Code, which empower the donee to appoint to herself or her estate." S
The court reasoned that the will did not refer to the Maryland general
or hybrid power, but it was the section 2041 (b) (1) "definition the
testator embraced by his explicit reference to the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code."8' Thus the court found the necessary intent
of the testator to incorporate this definition. With respect to the other
requirements, the reference in the will is to a document, the Internal
Revenue Code, existing at the time the will was executed, and the ref-
erence to "amendments made thereafter" would not incorporate such
changes unless made before execution of the will.
It is interesting to note that neither the district court nor the
circuit court in Guiney referred specifically to the doctrine of incor-
poration by reference or cited any Maryland cases to support the in-
73. 164 Md. at 44-45, 163 A. at 821.
74. Id. at 46, 163 A. at 822.
75. See Buchwald v. Buchwald, 175 Md. 103, 114, 199 A. 795, 800 (1938) ; 2 W.BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 19.23 (Revised Treatise 1962).76. Hull's Estate, 164 Md. 39, 46, 163 A. 819, 822 (1933).77. See 2 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 19.24 (Revised
Treatise 1962).
78. See Zimmerman v. Hafer, 81 Md. 347, 32 A. 316 (1895) ; 2 W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WsS § 19.24 (Revised Treatise 1962).
79. 425 F.2d at 147.
80. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). The court pointed out that a reference to the
marital deduction provisions of the Code necessarily includes both sections 2056(b) (5)
and 2041 since these sections complement each other. If the donor's estate qualifiesfor the marital deduction under section 2056(b) (5), the estate of the donee having ageneral testamentary power must include the property under section 2041 for federal
estate tax purposes. Therefore, the section 2041(b) (1) definition of general power of
appointment is also read into section 2056(b) (5).
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corporation of the section 2041(b) (1) definition into the testator's
will. However, since the circuit court stressed that its decision was
"fully consonant with the Maryland law,"82 it must be presumed that
the court held that the definition had been incorporated by reference,
rather than merely that the definition could be inferred from the testa-
tor's use of the term "general power of appointment."
Assuming the correctness of this conclusion, the inquiry becomes
what the effect of this opinion will be and should be on the develop-
ment of Maryland law. The decision clearly does not bind the Court
of Appeals of Maryland; it is for the highest state court to determine
what the state law will be.83 The Maryland Court of Appeals could
negate this decision by a contrary ruling or by a simple declaration
that it is not the law in Maryland. Yet in view of the Frank dictum
that an orthodox general power of appointment can be created in Mary-
land, the Maryland Court of Appeals should not object to Guiney
merely because it was the first decision (except for Wyeth) to recog-
nize, in fact, such a creation. However, there is no reason why a
Maryland attorney should have to rely on the doctrine of incorporation
by reference when he can draft the instrument to provide that the donee
is given a general power of appointment such that he can appoint to
himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. The use
of this specific enabling language certainly should satisfy the Mary-
land courts as evidencing the donor's intent to create an orthodox
general power and not merely the Maryland hybrid.
Perhaps the most important question arising from Guiney is that
of the effect of creating an orthodox general testamentary power of
appointment coupled with a life estate in the donee. One of the reasons
behind the Balls v. Dampman rule was the court's fear that such an
arrangement would "convert . . . a mere life tenant into an owner of
the fee." 4 If this is in fact the effect of such an arrangement, the
donee in Guiney had a fee simple. Such a construction would certainly
have far-reaching consequences. Whereas the life tenant with a general
testamentary power has a limited property interest and must appoint
by will, the owner of the fee has legal and equitable title to the
property and can convey it during his life. Whereas a creditor of the
donee, in the absence of statute, cannot attach property subject to an
unexercised general power of appointment,8 he could reach the prop-
erty if the "donee" is deemed an owner in fee simple. 6 Whereas a
82. 425 F.2d at 150.
83. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940); Pierpont v. Com-'
missioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
84. 69 Md. 390, 395, 16 A. 16, 18 (1888).
85. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 944 (2d ed.
1956). This rule does not apply if the power is exercised by will in favor of the
donee or his estate or third person and the donee's estate is insufficient to meet his
creditor's claim. Id. at § 945. This exception would not apply to aid creditors in
respect to property subject to the Maryland hybrid power since this power is not
truly general but more akin to a limited or special power. See also Frank v. Frank,
253 Md. 413, 416, 253 A.2d 377, 379 (1969); Connor v. O'Hara, 188 Md. 527, 530,
53 A.2d 33, 34 (1947).
86. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 1 (1969).
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surviving spouse does not have dower or a statutory distributive
share in property subject to a general power,87 such property would
be subject to these claims if her husband-donee is viewed as an owner
in fee simple.88 Whereas a person may be designated by the donor to
take the property in default of the donee's failure to exercise his
power, the contingent rights of such a taker in default would be
eliminated if the donee is deemed to be an owner in fee simple.
While the aforementioned consequences of such an interpretation are
not exhaustive, they do illustrate the total abrogation of a careful
estate plan if the donee of a general power of appointment is viewed
instead as an owner in fee simple.
Of course, the Balls statement concerning the conversion of the
life tenant possessing a general testamentary power of appointment
into an owner in fee simple is mere dictum. But in view of the Mary-
land Court of Appeals' repetition of this dictum in subsequent cases, one
cannot disregard the possibility that it will be transformed into a rule
of law. To do so would not make Maryland the only jurisdiction to
view such a donee as an owner in fee simple; Virginia has made
this determination.89
On the other hand, the Balls case was decided in 1888, a time
when the use of powers of appointment was quite limited and judicial
understanding of the principles involved was not great. 0 There was
no established American law of powers of appointment, and the few
cases "tended to reach conclusions upon uncritical citation of English
authorities."9 1 In Guiney the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the Mary-
land Court of Appeals' primary concern in Balls that the creation of
a life estate coupled with an unrestricted power of appointment would
merge the interests into a fee simple absolute. The circuit court,
however, implied that this Maryland view is outdated by noting that
"with developments in the law of trusts and estates, the courts in-
terpreting Maryland law have come to reflect a more modern view,
viz., that while it would be an impermissible frustration of the donor's
desire if creditors of the donee were allowed to benefit from the donor's
property in the absence of a clear statement that the donor so intended,
yet, where he sufficiently expresses his desire to give the donee the
power to appoint to herself or her estate, this intent must likewise
not be frustrated."92 If the donor intended the donee to have a fee
87. See L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 947 (2d ed.
1956). This rule applies regardless of whether or not the donee-spouse has exercised
the power of appointment.
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 3-202 to -203 (1969) abolishes dower and curtesy
rights but gives the surviving spouse a right to an elective share in the decedent's
,,state.
89. See, e.g., Virginia Nat'l Bank v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Va.1969); Mowery v. Coffman, 185 Va. 491, 39 S.E.2d 285 (1946); Hansborough v.
Trustees of the Presbyterian Church, 110 Va. 15, 65 S.E. 467 (1909).
90. 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 385 (1970).
91. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note, Ch. 25 (1940).
92. 425 F.2d at 148-49.
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simple, the donor would not have given the latter a mere life estate
with a general power. The use of powers also allows the donor a
certain degree of flexibility in the final distribution of his assets.93
Besides the policy argument that adherence to the Balls dictum
would bring results clearly contrary to the donor's intent, perhaps
the strongest argument in favor of the Maryland courts' not converting
the donee into an owner in fee is the result reached by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in the Wyeth case, where the donor and donee were
the same person.94 Instead of ruling that the donor kept or gave to
himself a fee simple, the court recognized an exception to the Balls
rule and held that an orthodox general power was created under the
specific circumstances. The case can, therefore, be viewed as overruling
the mere dictum in Balls. And in Frank, the court, recognizing in
dictum the possibility of creating an orthodox general power in Mary-
land, did not express a fear of converting the life tenant into an owner in
fee simple. Thus, while the possibility exists that the Maryland courts
would negate the donor's estate plan by converting the donee into an
owner in fee, it is unlikely that they would do so.
CONCLUSION
Although the issue has never been actually decided by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, it seems clear that a true general power of appoint-
ment can be created in Maryland. Guiney v. United States strongly
reinforces this proposition. The only way that such a power of
appointment can be created is by use of language expressing an intent
that the donee is authorized to exercise the power in favor of himself, his
creditors, his estate or the creditors of his estate. In the absence of such
explicit authorization, an unlimited power of appointment creates only
the Maryland hybrid power in the donee. Certainly the Guiney opinion
accepted this interpretation of the Maryland law on general powers
of appointment in reaching -its decision.
While Guiney relied on the doctrine of incorporation by reference
to reach its decision, the draftsman should instead use the specific
enabling language set out in section 2041(b)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code in creating an orthodox general power of appointment.
If such language is used in the instrument itself, there is no possibility
that a Maryland court would apply the restrictive Balls rule. Also,
while the answer to the question raised by the Balls dictum with respect
to a conversion to a fee simple is not entirely certain, a reasonable
interpretation of the case law and a consideration of the usefulness of
powers of appointment should result in the court's upholding the
donor's intent by not converting the donee of an orthodox general
power who also owns a life estate in the property subject to the power
into an owner in fee simple of the property subject to the power.
93. See, e.g., G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 264.20 (2d ed. 1964); Moser, Some Aspects of Powers of Appointment in Mary-
land, 12 MD. L. REv. 13 (1951).
94. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
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